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Cognitive models suggest that during social interactions, socially anxious individuals direct their
attention to internal cues of arousal and use this information to erroneously infer how they appear to
others. High (N ¼ 36) and low (N ¼ 36) socially anxious adults had a conversation with a stooge,
and were led to believe by false feedback that they were experiencing either an increase or decrease in
arousal, or evaluating the comfort level of the feedback equipment. Compared to the other groups,
participants who believed their arousal had increased, reported greater anxiety, poorer perceived
performance, more physical cues of anxiety, and greater underestimation of their performance and
overestimation of the visibility of their anxiety. The effects were not speciﬁc to participants with high
social anxiety. Observers rated the behaviour of participants who believed that their arousal had
decreased most favourably. The results have implications for the treatment of social phobia.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd.
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Social phobia is an isolating anxiety disorder in which sufferers are overly concerned
with how they appear to others. They fear saying or doing something that is embarrassing,
and this often includes exhibiting physical symptoms, such as blushing, sweating or
trembling. They believe other people will notice and then judge them harshly. However,2006 Elsevier Ltd.
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anxiety despite repeated exposure to their feared stimuli (social situations) and in the
absence of direct negative feedback has puzzled clinicians and researchers.
Cognitive models of social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997)
conceptualise the attention to, and misinterpretation of, internal information as a key
factor in maintaining the disorder. Clark and Wells (1995) propose that when social
phobics become concerned about how they are coming across, they shift their attention
away from others to detailed monitoring of themselves. The self-monitoring heightens
their attention to internal information, which they then use to make erroneous inferences
about how they are coming across. The internal information may include somatic
information, thoughts and/or images. For example, social phobics may experience a warm
feeling in their cheek, believe that it is a sign that they are blushing, believe that blushing is
a sign of inadequate social performance, and infer that they are coming across poorly.
A number of studies lend preliminary support to the role of internal cues in social
anxiety. Recent research suggests that compared to non-clinical controls, people with
social phobia are more likely to interpret physical symptoms, such as blushing, sweating or
trembling, as evidencing something negative, such as intense anxiety or a psychiatric
condition (e.g., Roth, Antony, & Swinson, 2001). In addition, their fear of exhibiting these
symptoms is more likely to heighten their awareness of them. For example, Mulkens, De
Jong, Dobbelaar, and Boegels (1999) required high and low fear of blushing individuals to
engage in two social tasks which varied in levels of embarrassment. Objective measures of
facial coloration and skin temperature indicated that the more embarrassing task produced
more coloration for both groups. However, it was just the high fear of blushing individuals
who reported greater blushing intensity, indicating a relationship between feared physical
symptom of anxiety and heightened awareness of this symptom.
Six studies have provided results consistent with the hypothesis that people with social
phobia use internal information to erroneously infer how they appear to others (e.g.,
Mansell & Clark, 1999; McEwan & Devins, 1983; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Mulkens et al.,
1999; Papageourgiou & Wells, 2002; Wells & Papageorgiou, 2001). McEwan and Devins
(1983) found that high socially anxious individuals who reported experiencing intense
somatic sensations in social situations overestimated how anxious they appeared to their
peers. In contrast, there were no discrepancies between self and peer ratings of anxiety
visibility for low socially anxious individuals and high socially anxious individuals who
reported low-intensity somatic sensations, highlighting a correlation between the perceived
intensity and visibility of anxiety symptoms.
Mellings and Alden (2000) required high and low socially anxious individuals to have a
conversation with a confederate. Compared to the ratings of an independent assessor,
high socially anxious individuals overestimated the visibility of several anxiety-related
behaviours and the amount of overestimation was positively correlated with self-focused
attention during the interaction.
Mansell and Clark (1999) required high and low socially anxious individuals to give a
speech following a social threat induction in which half of the participants were led to
believe that their performance was going to be rated by the experimenter and later by a
team of psychologists. The other participants were given a no threat induction. Following
the speech, participants rated their awareness of bodily sensations during the speech and
how well they thought they appeared and performed. An independent assessor also rated
participants’ appearance and performance. Both high and low anxious individuals
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There was a signiﬁcant positive correlation between perceived bodily sensations and the
extent to which high socially anxious individuals overestimated the visibility of global
negative behaviours (i.e., looking anxious, awkward, unconﬁdent). For both groups, there
was a signiﬁcant positive correlation between perceived bodily sensations and visibility of
speciﬁc negative behaviours (i.e., sweating, shaking, blushing). The results suggest that
high and low socially anxious individuals may use awareness of physical sensations to
make judgements about the visibility of speciﬁc negative behaviours. But it is the high
anxious individuals who go on to use these cues to make negative global inferences about
their social performance. The design of this study was correlational, however, so it was not
possible to establish a causal role for awareness of physiological sensations, subjective
anxiety and perceptions of social performance.
In a more direct attempt to investigate this causal hypothesis, Wells and Papageorgiou
(2001) used a false feedback paradigm. Eight patients with social phobia had conversations
with a confederate under three different sets of pre-conversation information: (1) no
feedback about physiology followed by (2) false feedback of an increased heart rate and
(3) false feedback of a decreased heart rate. The latter two conditions were counter-
balanced. Patients completed anxiety and belief ratings. Feedback of an increased heart
rate led to increments in anxiety, negative beliefs and self-processing. The confederate
rated patients as less anxious in the Decrease condition than when they were in the
Increase condition. The results suggest that the perception of increased arousal was
associated with increased anxiety and actual poorer performance. But did feedback
inﬂuence actual physiological arousal and was this responsible for increased anxiety?
To investigate this, Papageourgiou and Wells (2002) compared two groups of high and
low socially anxious individuals who received information that their heart rate had
increased or no information prior to a conversation with a confederate. Actual heart rate
was measured throughout the conversation. The results showed that only high socially
anxious individuals receiving information about increased heart rate reported signiﬁcantly
greater anxiety and negative social performance. Actual heart rates were not affected by
feedback for either high or low socially anxious individuals in either condition, suggesting
that body information did not affect actual physiological arousal (as measured by heart
rate). Rather, body information inﬂuenced subjective anxiety and the perception of
visibility of arousal in high socially anxious individuals.
Although these studies lend preliminary support to the Clark and Wells (1995)
prediction that social phobics use interoceptive cues during social interactions to interpret
how they come across, there are some limitations which warrant further clariﬁcation. For
example, most studies (e.g., Mansell & Clark, 1999; McEwan & Devins, 1983; Mulkens
et al., 1999) have looked at retrospective ratings of physical signs of anxiety rather than
online processing of this information and its effect on anxiety and performance. Wells and
Papageorgiou (2001) and Papageourgiou and Wells (2002) manipulated the information
about the participants’ body states prior to their social interaction rather than during the
interaction. Further, participants received only information about their heart rate, which
may not correlate directly with other feared physical signs of anxiety that the individual
may be concerned about, such as blushing.
The aim of the current study was to assess the effect of online interpretation of internal
cues related to physical signs of anxiety on subsequent anxiety and actual and perceived
performance. High and low socially anxious individuals were selected for participation.
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individuals and those with social phobia (e.g., Mansell & Clark, 1999; Mellings & Alden,
2000). A false feedback paradigm was used in which participants had a conversation with a
neutral confederate while receiving information about their level of arousal.
2. Method
2.1. Overview
High and low socially anxious individuals had a conversation with an experimenter’s
confederate (who was not aware to which condition the participant had been assigned)
while receiving false feedback about their level of arousal, consisting of vibrations
delivered to the participants’ chest at set time intervals. The meaning of the vibrations was
manipulated experimentally by three different instructions. Participants were told that the
vibrations indicated (a) an increase in arousal, (b) a decrease in arousal, or (c) were
irrelevant for the experiment (control). We predicted that participants receiving false
feedback of increased arousal would (1) show greater subjective anxiety, (2) rate the
success of the conversation and their social performance as poorer, (3) report greater
perception of bodily sensations, (4) obtain less favourable observer ratings of performance,
and (5) underestimate their performance and overestimate the visibility of their anxiety,
compared to participants who received false feedback of a decrease in anxiety or control
instructions. We further predicted that the differences between the effects of the different
instructions would be greater in high socially anxious individuals than in low socially
anxious individuals. Finally, we predicted that for participants with high social anxiety,
perceived bodily sensations would be associated with low perceived success of the
conversation, more negative ratings of their social performance, and greater under-
estimation of their performance and overestimation of the visibility of their anxiety.
2.2. Participants
Participants were 72 university students in London. They were enrolled in a range of
disciplines: nursing (N ¼ 19), architecture (N ¼ 12), war studies (N ¼ 10), psychology
(N ¼ 10), biological sciences (N ¼ 9), art (N ¼ 5), law (N ¼ 3), religious studies (N ¼ 3),
and computer science (N ¼ 1). They were selected because they had scores in the top 25%
(17 or greater) and bottom 25% (9 or less) of the general population on the Fear of
Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969). Each group had 36 (15 male,
21 female) participants. Participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions,
stratiﬁed by sex: Increase, Decrease, and Control, giving a total of six experimental groups.
Eighteen additional participants were excluded and replaced: eight because they switched
social anxiety category between FNE screening and the experiment, and 10 because they
did not believe the experimental manipulation. Of those who switched FNE categories,
three were psychology students, and there was one student from each of the following
disciplines: history, architecture, nursing, war studies and engineering. Of the ten who did
not believe the manipulation, six were nursing students, two were studying architecture,
and there was one student studying languages and one studying war studies. There were no
signiﬁcant differences in the proportion of participants with high and low anxiety who
believed or did not believe the manipulations. Table 1 shows the mean ages and FNE
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of other questionnaires measuring social and general anxiety: the State–Trait Anxiety
Inventory, trait and state versions (STAI-T and STAI-S, Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene,
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), the Social Interaction and Anxiety Scale (SIAS, Mattick & Clarke,
1998), and the Autonomic Perception Questionnaire (APQ) (with the instruction to
complete it for how they generally feel when they are anxious) (Mandler, Mandler, &
Uviller, 1958). As to be expected, t-tests indicated signiﬁcant group differences in all self-
report measures, but not in age.
The age of participants and their scores on the questionnaires were submitted to two-
way analyses of variance (ANOVA) with two factors: social anxiety and condition. There
were no main effects of condition. In addition to the main effects of social anxiety (see
Table 1), there were signiﬁcant interactions of social anxiety and condition for trait anxiety
(STAI-T), F(2,66) ¼ 5.76, po.01, and the APQ, F(2,66) ¼ 4.61, po.05.
Follow-up ANOVAs with Tukey HSD tests indicated that within the high social anxiety
group, participants in the Increase condition scored higher on the STAI-T, F(2,33) ¼ 5.8,
po.01, and APQ, F(2,33) ¼ 5.1, po.05, than participants in the Decrease and Control
conditions, whereas there were no differences on the measures between the conditions for
the low anxiety group.
2.3. Confederates
There were three female confederates. Two were research assistants who had
conversations with the majority of participants (N ¼ 67). One was a volunteer who had
conversations with ﬁve of the participants. The experimenter (JW) trained them to act in a
pleasant but neutral manner. The instructions were to let the participant initiate and lead
the conversation. The confederate could break silences of 10 s or more.
To assess confederate consistency, an independent assessor rated a random selection of
video recordings of the confederate’s behaviour in the conversations on a 7-point scale,
where 3 was unfriendly, 0 was neutral and +3 was friendly. They rated a total of 30
conversations: 10 of the Decrease condition, 10 of the Increase condition and 10 of the
Control condition. To assess reliability of the assessor’s performance ratings, a psychology
research assistant also rated the videotapes of 10 conversations. Inter-rater reliability based
on Pearson correlation coefﬁcients was good, r ¼ .87, po.001.Table 1
Participant characteristics
Low social anxiety (N ¼ 36) High social anxiety (N ¼ 36) t-test
M SD M SD
Age 24.3 5.2 22.0 5.0 t(1,70) ¼ 1.89, p4.05
FNE 4.7 2.5 23.9 3.7 t(1,61.19) ¼ 25.51, po.001
STAI-S 29.4 7.2 44.9 10.0 t(1,70) ¼ 7.62, po.001
STAI-T 31.4 7.3 51.4 9.7 t(1,70) ¼ 9.96, po.001
SIAS 9.9 5.9 34.9 14.2 t(1,46.7) ¼ 9.78, po.001
APQ 31.2 14.3 52.4 16.5 t(1,70) ¼ 5.85, po.001
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The apparatus used to deliver false feedback consisted of a surgical skin pad, mobile
phone solenoid, a circuitry control box, and a computer. The surgical skin pad was placed
on the back of participants’ necks and was set up to look as though it was measuring heart
rate traces. It was attached to a wire that fed to the circuitry control box, which in turn was
linked to the computer and the mobile phone solenoid. The solenoid was encased in a small
plastic box and taped to the upper right of participants’ chests. The computer delivered
nine episodes of vibration to the solenoid via the control box for a duration of 5 s. These
were delivered at variable intervals approximately once every minute (i.e., at the following
time points during the 8-min conversation: 10, 70, 130, 190, 240, 300, 360, 420 and 478 s).
2.5. Instructions
False feedback: Participants in the Increase and Decrease conditions were told:This is the equipment. It monitors your body and gives you feedback during the
conversation. It consists of this sensor here and this vibrator. I am going to place this
sensor over a blood vessel in the back of your neck. The sensor measures most
aspects of arousal. A key component of arousal is heart rate and the sensor picks up
any changes in heart rate. The sensor also measures temperature changes of the sort
that could happen in blushing. It detects skin moisture allowing it to pick up
sweating, and it measures vibrations, allowing it to detect trembling. So, in summary,
the sensor measures most aspects of arousal and feeds the information to the
vibrator.Participants in the Increase condition were then told:If you notice the vibrator going off at the start of the conversation, it’s because we’ve
deﬁnitely picked up an increase in your pulse and level of arousal. If your body
continues to have a high pulse rate and level of arousal, the vibrator will tell you this
by giving you a signal approximately once every minute.Participants in the Decrease condition were told:If you notice the vibrator going off at the start of the conversation, it’s because we’ve
deﬁnitely picked up a decrease in your pulse and level of arousal. If your body
continues to have a low pulse rate and low level of arousal, the vibrator will tell you
this by giving you a signal approximately once every minute.The equipment was then attached to the participant and they were shown a fake heart
rate trace on the computer to indicate that the equipment was working.
Control condition: Participants were told that the piece of equipment had nothing to do
with the experiment as follows:This piece of equipment has actually nothing to do with today’s experiment. Instead
it’s something that we’re developing for a future experiment. And one of the
preliminary things we do when we’re creating a new bit of equipment is a basic check
on whether it’s uncomfortable or not. So, what I’m going to do is at the end
of your session today, I’m just going to ask you to tell me whether or not it was
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is going to have to vibrate occasionally. And for this reason, our technician may have
programmed it to occasionally vibrate while you’re wearing it. If that happens, of
course the vibrations have nothing to do with you and have no signiﬁcance to you.
We just want to know whether it was uncomfortable or not at the end of the
experiment.Participants in the Control condition were not shown the fake heart rate trace.
2.6. Dependent measures
Participants’ ratings: Following the conversation and after the equipment had been
removed, participants rated how anxious they had felt during the conversation on a 0–8
scale (‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’). They also rated how well they thought they came across
on a 0–8 scale (‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’). This latter question measured their perceived
success of the conversation. Participants completed the modiﬁed version of Stopa and
Clark’s (1993) Behaviours Checklist to assess their perception of how they appeared during
the conversation (perceived social performance). The questionnaire consists of 15 items:
seven global positive descriptors (e.g., conﬁdent, friendly, relaxed), four global negative
descriptors (e.g., embarrassed, boring), and four speciﬁc negative descriptors (e.g., voice
quivering, left long gaps in conversation). Each item was rated on a 0–8 scale (‘not at all’ to
‘extremely’). Positive scores were reversed, and the items summed to give a total score
indicating the degree to which participants thought they came across badly. The internal
consistency for the scale was a ¼ .89. Furthermore, participants completed the speciﬁc
form of the APQ (Bergman & Johnson, 1971; Johansson & O¨st, 1982) to assess their
perception of bodily sensations during the conversation.
Confederate’s and assessor’s ratings of participant’s performance: After the conversation,
the confederate completed the Behaviours Checklist—Observer Form (Stopa & Clark,
1993). It included 15 ratings of positive and negative aspects of participants’ behaviours
during the conversation. Each item was rated on a 0–8 scale (‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’).
Positive scores were reversed and the items summed to give a total score. The internal
consistency of the scale was a ¼ .89.
The conversation was videotaped and an independent assessor (who was not aware to
which condition the participant had been assigned) rated the participant’s behaviour on
the Behaviour Checklist—Observer Form. The internal consistency of the assessor scale
was a ¼ .91. To assess reliability of the assessor’s performance ratings, a psychology
research assistant also rated the videotapes of ten participants’ conversations. Inter-rater
reliability for the total score, based on Pearson correlation coefﬁcients, was good, r ¼ .90,
po.001.
Underestimation of performance and overestimation of visibility of anxiety: The extent to
which participants underestimated their performance during the conversation was
determined by (1) subtracting the confederate’s rating on the Behaviours Checklist—
Observer Form from the participant’s score on the Behaviours Checklist, and
(2) calculating a parallel score for the discrepancy from the independent assessor ratings.
The extent to which participants overestimated the visibility of their anxiety was
determined by subtracting the assessor ratings of how anxious the participant looked from
their self-rating of how anxious they thought they looked (on the Behaviours Checklist).
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Participants were tested individually 1–2 weeks after completing a screening FNE. They
had received an information sheet describing the study at screening. The study was explained
as a study investigating how different people respond to social interactions. Upon arrival, all
participants were reminded that the experiment involved completing some questionnaires
and then having a conversation with a stranger while wearing a piece of equipment before
completing a ﬁnal, but brief set of questionnaires. Written informed consent was obtained.
Following this, participants completed the following questionnaires: STAI-S, STAI-T, SIAS,
FNE, and the APQ. Participants were then taken to another room.
Participants in all three experimental conditions were told that they would have a
conversation with a stranger and that they could talk about anything that they wanted to
talk about, with the exception of the equipment they were wearing. They received a few
suggestions such as where they lived in London, a ﬁlm they had recently seen, a holiday
they had been on or what they were studying. They were ﬁtted with the equipment and
received the instructions for the Increase, Decrease or Control condition.
The experimenter (JW) then left the room, and the confederate entered. After 8min had
elapsed, the experimenter returned and informed the participant that he/she could stop talking.
Following the conversation, participants rated how comfortable the equipment was on a
0 (‘‘not at all’’) to 8 (‘‘extremely’’) scale. They completed the dependent measures and a
manipulation check measure. This questionnaire asked them to indicate whether the
vibrator had gone off during the conversation, and if so, to estimate how many times it had
gone off. Participants in the Increase and Decrease conditions also indicated to what extent
they believed the vibrations they felt were giving them information about their bodily
sensations on a 0–100 scale (‘not at all’ to ‘completely’). Participants whose belief ratings
were below 50% were excluded.
2.8. Data analyses
Two-way condition by group ANOVAs tested whether the three experimental conditions
(Increase/Decrease/Control) led to differences in self-reported anxiety, perceived performance,
perceived physiological symptoms, and observer ratings of the participants’ behaviour for the
high and low social anxiety groups. Analyses were repeated including the participant’s sex as
an additional factor. There were no main effects of sex, with the exception of higher scores for
women on the APQ, and no interactions of sex with the experimental factors. To rule out that
the pattern of results was due to the observed differences in STAI-T and the APQ, additional
two-way analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) included trait anxiety (STAI-T) and trait APQ
scores as covariates with the factors condition and social anxiety group. Signiﬁcant main
effects of condition were further analysed with pairwise ANCOVAs.
Manipulation checks (number of vibrations participants reported, extent to which
participants believed the vibrations reﬂected their bodily responses) were analysed with
two-way condition by group ANOVAs. Kruskal–Wallis w2 analyses were performed on the
independent assessor’s ratings of confederate behaviour to assess confederate consistency:
in the different conditions and between the different confederates.
Pearson correlations were conducted within each of the social anxiety groups to
determine the association between perceived bodily sensations, and the estimation of
performance and visibility of anxiety.
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3.1. Manipulation checks
The experimental conditions did not differ in the number of vibrations participants
reported, and there were no main effects or interactions with social anxiety group (all p’s
4.50). Similarly, there were no differences between the Increase and Decrease conditions
in the extent to which they believed that the feedback reﬂected their bodily state, and no
main effects or interactions with social anxiety group (all p’s4.80).
There were no differences in confederate behaviour between conditions, using Kruskal-
Wallis, w2 (2, N ¼ 30) ¼ 2.15, p ¼ .342. There were no differences in behaviour between
confederates, using Kruskal-Wallis, w2 (2, N ¼ 30) ¼ 2.5, p ¼ .286.
3.2. Participants’ ratings
Table 2 shows the results for the participants’ ratings of their anxiety, perceived
success of the conversation, and perceived social performance and bodily sensations
during the conversation. The ANOVAs showed highly signiﬁcant main effects of condition
for each of the variables: anxiety, F(2,66) ¼ 13.78, po.001; success, F(2,66) ¼ 8.55,
po.001; social performance, F(2,66) ¼ 12.33, po.001; bodily sensations, F(2,66) ¼ 17.86,
po.001. In addition, there were highly signiﬁcant main effects of social anxiety
(all p’so.001), but no interactions. The high social anxiety group scored higher
on all measures than the low social anxiety group. When STAI-T and APQ
were controlled for by ANCOVA, all condition effects remained signiﬁcant:
anxiety, F(2,64) ¼ 10.55, po.001; success, F(2,64) ¼ 6.46, po.005; social performance,
F(2,64) ¼ 9.09, po.001; bodily sensations, F(2,64) ¼ 15.01, po.001. For all measures,
participants in the Increase condition scored higher than those in the Decrease
condition (all p’so.005) and those in the Control condition (all p’so.05). Participants
in the Decrease condition scored lower than those in the Control condition on the
APQ (po.05).
3.3. Assessor and confederate ratings of participants’ performance
As shown in Table 2, both the confederate and the independent assessor rated the high
social anxiety participants’ performance as poorer than that of the low social anxiety
group, F(1,55) ¼ 19.98, po.001 (confederate) and F(1,63) ¼ 23.46, po.001 (assessor).
There were also main effects of condition, F(2,55) ¼ 7.34, p ¼ .001 and F(2,63) ¼ 4.32,
po.05, respectively, but no interactions. The condition effects remained signiﬁcant
when STAI-T and APQ were controlled in ANCOVAs, F(2,53) ¼ 6.72, po.005 and
F(2,61) ¼ 3.44, po.05. Participants in the Decrease condition received more favourable
ratings than those in the Increase and Control conditions (all p’so.05).
Additional separate analyses of positive and negative items of the Behaviours Checklist
showed that the differences between the conditions were mainly due to differences on
positive items. For assessor ratings, there were no effects of condition for negative
items. For confederate ratings, the ANCOVAs did show a signiﬁcant condition effect for
negative items, F (2,53) ¼ 3.50, po.05, but a larger condition effect for positive items,
F(2,53) ¼ 7.64, p ¼ .001. The item ‘‘How anxious did the person look?’’ did not show
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Effects of the experimental manipulation on anxiety, perceived performance, and observer ratings of the
participants’ behaviour














Anxiety (0–8) 6.0 (1.3) 3.0 (1.6) 4.5 (2.1) 2.7 (.9) 1.4 (.8) 1.6 (1.4)
Perceived success of conversation (0–8) 3.0 (2.4) 5.3 (1.4) 4.8 (1.6) 5.1 (1.3) 6.3 (.6) 6.1 (1.8)
Social performance (BCh) 77.1 (15.2) 48.8 (14.9) 55.8 (24.9) 42.4 (17.3) 26.4 (9.1) 27.4 (11.4)
Perceived bodily sensations during conversation
(APQ)
44.5 (12.1) 17.4 (8.1) 31.0 (16.7) 23.9 (10.6) 11.6 (7.5) 15.0 (10.6)
Observer ratings of participants’ performance
Independent assessor (BCh) 44.5 (14.4) 35.9 (10.6) 41.7 (8.6) 32.3 (9.0) 24.0 (8.2) 30.6 (8.1)
Confederate (BCh) 40.6 (9.2) 31.5 (13.3) 40.4 (11.7) 27.5 (13.0) 13.5 (6.0) 30.3 (14.3)
Participants’ underestimation of their performance
Compared to independent assessor 32.6 (15.4) 13.3 (10.5) 17.2 (18.5) 10.2 (20.1) 4.0 (11.7) 3.3
(11.5)
Compared to confederate 40.0 (12.1) 18.5 (15.6) 21.7 (19.2) 13.7 (19.7) 13.0 (8.6) 2.9
(16.9)
Visibility of anxiety 4.3 (2.1) 1.5 (2.3) 2.8 (2.1) 2.5 (1.6) .2 (1.3) .5 (1.0)
APQ: Autonomic Perceptions Questionnaire; BCh: Behaviours Checklist.
Low scores indicate favourable ratings.
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effects of social anxiety group, all p’so.001).
3.4. Underestimation of performance and overestimation of visibility of anxiety
As shown in Table 2, the high social anxiety group underestimated their performance to
a greater extent than the low anxiety group, both compared to the confederate,
F(1,55) ¼ 20.06, po.001, and the independent observer, F(1,63) ¼ 22.14, po.001, and
overrated the visibility of their anxiety, F(1,63) ¼ 18.17, po.001. There were also main
effects of condition, F(2,55) ¼ 5.65, po.001, F(2,63) ¼ 6.21, po.005, and F(2,63) ¼ 11.70,
po.001, respectively. The condition effects remained signiﬁcant when STAI-T and APQ
were controlled in ANCOVAs, F(2,53) ¼ 4.45, po.05, F(2,61) ¼ 3.88, po.05, and
F(1,61) ¼ 9.10, po.001. Participants in the Increase condition underestimated their
performance more than those in the Control condition for confederate ratings (po.05),
and, as a trend, for observer ratings (p ¼ .064). Participants in the Increase condition
overrated the visibility of their anxiety to a greater extent than those in the Decrease
(p o.01) and Control conditions (po.02).
3.5. Correlations
In the high social anxiety group, perceived bodily sensations during the conversation
(APQ) correlated with perceived success of the conversation, r ¼ .51, po.005, negativity
of perceived performance, r ¼ .71, po.001, the degree to which participants under-
estimated their performance, r ¼ .48, po.01, and overestimated the visibility of their
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group, but the size of correlations was lower, r ¼ .32, po.06, r ¼ .51, po.001, r ¼ .33,
p ¼ .06, and r ¼ .36, po.05, respectively.
4. Discussion
In line with the hypotheses, participants who were led to believe that their arousal had
increased during a conversation with a stranger felt more anxious, felt that they were
coming across badly, and reported more bodily sensations than participants who did not
receive feedback on their arousal levels or those who were led to believe that their arousal
had decreased. This ﬁnding is in line with cognitive models that state that attention to
internal cues of perceived arousal in social situations inﬂuences anxiety, and actual and
perceived performance.
However, contrary to expectation, we did not ﬁnd that this effect was more pronounced
in participants in high compared to low social anxiety. False feedback of increased arousal
affected participants with low social anxiety to the same extent as those with high anxiety,
although their overall level of anxiety was lower and they rated their social performance
during the conversation more favourably. The ﬁnding of similar increments in anxiety in
high and low anxiety groups is consistent with Mansell and Clark (1999) who found that
both groups experienced the same increments and level of anxiety following a social threat
induction. It is possible that information regarding increased arousal acts in the same way
as perceived social threat possibly drawing attention to the importance of performance and
immediate attention on the self. However, if this were solely the case, then one would
expect no differences in anxiety and performance between high and low socially anxious
individuals in the false feedback study of Papageourgiou and Wells (2002). They found
that only high anxious individuals receiving information about increased heart rate
reported signiﬁcantly greater anxiety and negative performance. The effect was not seen in
low anxious individuals. However, they provided information about heart rate only, rather
than physiological information which could correlate with a wide range of anxiety
symptoms and social performance concerns, such as blushing, shaking, and sweating.
Further, false feedback was provided prior to participants’ conversations. It was therefore
not possible to determine the online impact of such information. Low anxious individuals
may not attend to body state information throughout a conversation when this
information is provided beforehand. However, when it is provided online, they may be
more likely to shift their attention and attend to it with a subsequent impact on anxiety and
performance.
The most likely reason for the pattern of results then is that the experimental
instructions focused the attention of all participants’ on their ‘‘arousal’’, regardless of
social anxiety status. There was no difference between the high and low social anxiety
groups in the number of vibrations they detected or in the extent to which they believed the
feedback reﬂected their bodily state. Thus, low socially anxious participants in the Increase
condition were experimentally made to behave like patients with social phobia, in that they
were made to shift their attention away from the conversation to the monitoring of their
increasing arousal. This would explain why they showed greater anxiety and thought they
came across less favourably than low socially anxious people in the Decrease and Control
conditions. Other research suggests that when people are able to allocate their attention
freely, high socially anxious people are more likely than those with low social anxiety to
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evaluative threat (Mansell, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003), and would therefore be expected to be
more likely to experience the adverse effects of monitoring their increasing arousal.
This ﬁts with the Clark and Wells (1995) cognitive model of social phobia in which self-
focused attention is a key maintaining factor. Self-focused attention facilitates self-
monitoring and hence, attention to physical cues of arousal while at the same time
preventing individuals with the disorder from processing how they are actually coming
across. Wells and Papageorgiou (2001) found that information about increased arousal
was associated with increased self-focused attention in patients with social phobia. They
suggest that attention may be the mechanism by which perception of arousal affects
anxiety. Self-focused attention has been associated with anxious appearance (e.g., Woody,
1996) and poorer performance (e.g., Daly, Vangelisti, & Lawrence, 1989).
In this study, high socially anxious participants overrated how negatively they came
across to a greater extent than low socially anxious participants, compared to both the
confederate and the independent assessor. This is in line with Mellings and Alden (2000)
who found that socially phobic and non-anxious individuals overestimated their anxiety-
related behaviour relative to observers, but socially phobic individuals did so to a greater
extent. Furthermore, as expected, the degree of overestimation varied with the
experimental condition. Participants who thought that their arousal had increased showed
greater overestimation than participants in the Control condition.
Did participants actually use their perceived physiological state to infer how they came
across to others? The effects of the experimental manipulation on participants’ ratings of
their social performance, and the pattern of correlations support this relationship. In the
high social anxiety group, perceived bodily sensations during the conversation correlated
highly with the perceived success of the conversation and more negative ratings of social
performance. In addition, perceived bodily sensations correlated with the degree of
underestimation of performance and overestimation of anxiety visibility, in line with the
ﬁndings of Mansell and Clark (1999) and McEwan and Devins (1983).
The experimental manipulation not only affected the participants’ impression of how
they came across, but also the actual impression they made on the confederate and an
independent assessor. In line with previous studies of social phobia, the high social anxiety
group made a less favourable impression overall (Alden & Wallace, 1995; Jones &
Carpenter, 1986; Norton & Hope, 2001; Stopa & Clark, 1993). As expected and consistent
with Wells and Papageorgiou (2001), participants in the Increase condition made a less
favourable impression than participants in the Decrease condition. Further, participants in
the Decrease condition were also rated more positively than participants in the Control
condition. However, there was no signiﬁcant difference between the Increase and Control
conditions, in contrast to the self-report measures.
The most likely explanation for the overall pattern of ﬁndings is as follows: Believing
one’s arousal is increasing during a social interaction has a large impact on the individual’s
perception of how well the interaction is going and how well they come across, as these are
inﬂuenced by anxiety level and perceived bodily sensations. However, this internal state is
not necessarily obvious to the social interaction partner and other observers, as indicated
by the absence of condition effects on the item ‘‘How anxious did the person look?’’, and
on negative items of the Behaviours Checklist for the independent assessor. Other people
appear more likely to pick up differences in positive behaviours, and accordingly, the
effects of the experimental manipulation on the assessor ratings were restricted to positive
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which had been reassured by the feedback that their arousal was decreasing and may thus
have come across in a more relaxed and accessible way. Thus, the pattern of results
suggests, in line with models of social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg,
1997), that relying on internal anxiety cues to infer how one comes across does not give a
good estimate of what others perceive during a social interaction.
The present results support several procedures used in cognitive therapy (Clark et al.,
2003) to treat social phobia. Discussion and behavioural experiments (including
videofeedback) are used to help patients to realise that focusing their attention on their
anxiety symptoms gives a misleading impression of how they come across and makes them
feel more anxious. They are also taught to shift their attention from monitoring their
internal state to the interaction with others, which seems to be helpful in both correcting
their impression that they are performing badly and in creating a more favourable
impression on others.
The present study had some limitations. First, the sample size was relatively small and
the random allocation led to a difference in trait anxiety and trait APQ scores between
high social anxiety participants allocated to the Increase versus Decrease and Control
conditions. However, the pattern of this difference does not explain the pattern of results
observed for the dependent measures (main effects of condition). Furthermore,
ANCOVAs established that the differences between the experimental conditions remained
signiﬁcant when STAI-T and APQ scores were controlled statistically. Second, the
experiment depended on false feedback and thus relied on the extent to which participants
believed the manipulation. A proportion of participants who did not believe the
manipulation had to be excluded. The majority of them were nursing students who may
have had more knowledge of physiology than students of other disciplines. Although we
did not observe systematic differences between people who did and did not believe the
feedback, it is conceivable that the results do not generalise to all people. Third, the
participants were student volunteers selected on the basis of their scores on a measure of
social anxiety, and it remains to be tested whether they generalise to patients with social
phobia. However, the results of previous studies using other paradigms suggest that such a
generalisation is likely (Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, &
Chen, 1999; Wells & Papageorgiou, 2001, 2002). Finally, we assessed bodily sensations
during the conversation by self-report and did not measure actual changes in physiology.
Thus, we are unable to determine whether the instructions led to any group differences
in the participants’ arousal. It is unlikely given that Papageourgiou and Wells (2002)
found no differences in actual physiological arousal between high and low socially
anxious individuals when they were given false feedback of increased arousal before a
conversation with a confederate. Other studies have also found no difference in actual
heart-rate during a social task between socially anxious and non-socially anxious
individuals (e.g., Grossman, Wilhelm, Kawachi, & Sparrow, 2001; Puigcerver, Martinez-
Selva, Garcia-Sanchez, & Gomez-Amor, 1989).
This study looked at online false feedback of arousal and found that participants who
were given false feedback of increased arousal during a conversation reported greater
anxiety, poorer perceived performance, more physical cues of anxiety, and greater
underestimation of their performance and overestimation of the visibility of their anxiety.
Although the effects of false feedback were similar across high and low social anxiety
groups, the feedback may have further inﬂuenced those with high social anxiety in that
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demonstrates how socially anxious individuals may be at a further disadvantage in social
situations. Shifting attention away from the negative meaning of internal cues of arousal
(as in the Decrease condition) improved performance and anxiety. This supports
techniques used in cognitive therapy of social phobia and underscores the need to help
sufferers shift attention away from internal cues of arousal.
Acknowledgements
The study was supported by a grant from the Wellcome Trust. We thank Kate Telford,
Rachel Handley and Allison Wild for their help with recruitment and testing.
References
Alden, L. E., & Wallace, S. T. (1995). Social phobia and social appraisal in successful and unsuccessful social
interactions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 497–505.
Bergman, J. S., & Johnson, H. J. (1971). The effects of instructional set and autonomic perception on cardiac
control. Psychophysiology, 8, 180–190.
Chen, Y. P., Ehlers, A., Clark, D. M., & Mansell, W. (2002). Patients with generalized social phobia direct their
attention away from faces. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 677–687.
Clark, D. M., Ehlers, A., McManus, F., Hackmann, A., Fennell, M., Campbell, H., et al. (2003). Cognitive
therapy versus ﬂuoxetine in generalised social phobia: A randomised placebo-controlled trial. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 71, 1058–1067.
Clark, D. M., &Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. Heimberg, M. Liebowitz, D. A. Hope,
& F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment and treatment. New York: Guilford Press.
Daly, J. A., Vangelisti, A. L., & Lawrence, S. G. (1989). Self-focused attention and public speaking anxiety.
Personality and Individual Differences, 10, 903–913.
Grossman, P., Wilhelm, F. H., Kawachi, I., & Sparrow, D. (2001). Gender differences in psychophysiological
responses to speech stress among older social phobics: Congruence and incongruence between self-evaluative
and cardiovascular reactions. Psychosomatic Medicine, 63, 765–777.
Johansson, J., & O¨st, L. G. (1982). Perception of autonomic reactions and actual heart rate in phobia patients.
Journal of Behavioural Assessment, 4, 133–143.
Jones, W. H., & Carpenter, B. N. (1986). Shyness, social behaviour and relationships. In W. H. Jones, J. M.
Cheek, & S. R. Briggs (Eds.), Shyness: Perspectives on research and treatment (pp. 227–238). New York:
Plenum Press.
Mandler, G., Mandler, J. M., & Uviller, E. T. (1958). Autonomic feedback: The perception of autonomic activity.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 56, 367–373.
Mansell, W., & Clark, D. M. (1999). How do I appear to others? Social anxiety and processing of the observable
self. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 419–434.
Mansell, W., Clark, D. M., Ehlers, A., & Chen, Y. P. (1999). Social anxiety and attention away from faces.
Cognition and Emotion, 13, 673–690.
Mansell, W., Clark, D. M., & Ehlers, A. (2003). Internal versus external attention in social anxiety: An
investigation using a novel paradigm. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 555–572.
Mattick, R. P., & Clarke, J. C. (1998). Development and validation of measures of social phobia scrutiny fear and
social interaction anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 455–470.
McEwan, K. L., & Devins, G. M. (1983). Is increased arousal in social anxiety noticed by others? Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 92, 417–421.
Mellings, T. M. B., & Alden, L. E. (2000). Cognitive processes in social anxiety: The effects of self-focus,
rumination and anticipatory processing. Behaviour and Research Therapy, 38, 243–257.
Mulkens, S., De Jong, P., Dobbelaar, A., & Boegels, S. M. (1999). Fear of blushing: Fearful preoccupation
irrespective of facial coloration. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 1119–1128.
Norton, P. J., & Hope, D. A. (2001). Kernels of truth or distorted perceptions: Self and observer ratings of social
anxiety and performance. Behavior Therapy, 32, 765–786.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
J. Wild et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 39 (2008) 102–116116Papageourgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2002). O1_MRKO1_MRKEffects of heart rate information on anxiety,
perspective taking, and performance in high and low social-evaluative anxiety. Behavior Therapy, 33, 181–199.
Puigcerver, A., Martinez-Selva, J., Garcia-Sanchez, F. S., & Gomez-Amor, J. (1989). Individual differences in
psychophysiological and subjective correlates of speech anxiety. Journal of Psychophysiology, 3, 75–81.
Rapee, R. M., & Heimberg, R. G. (1997). A cognitive-behavioural model of anxiety in social phobia. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 35, 741–756.
Roth, D., Antony, M. M., & Swinson, R. P. (2001). Interpretations for anxiety symptoms in social phobia.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 129–138.
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R. E., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1983). Manual for the
State–Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Stopa, L., & Clark, D. M. (1993). Cognitive processes in social phobia. Behaviour Research Therapy, 31, 255–267.
Watson, D., & Friend, R. (1969). Measurement of social-evaluative anxiety. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 33, 448–457.
Wells, A., & Papageorgiou, C. (2001). Social phobic interoception: Effects of bodily information on anxiety,
beliefs and self-processing. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 1–11.
Wells, A., & Papageorgiou, C. (2002). Effects of heart rate information on anxiety, perspective taking, and
performance in high and low social-evaluative anxiety. Behaviour Therapy, 33, 181–199.
Woody, S. R. (1996). Effects of focus of attention on anxiety levels and social performance of individuals with
social phobia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 29, 61–69.
